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JAPAN'S HIGH TECHNOLOGY INDUSTRIES: LESSONS AND LIMITATIONS OF INDUSTRIAL POLICY. Edited by Hugh Patrick. Seattle:
University of Washington Press. 1986. Pp. xxi, 277. $40.
Japan's High Technology Industries is a collection of essays developed as part of a project organized in 1983 "to provide a careful, objective analysis and evaluation of Japanese high technology industrial
policy and assess its relevance for the United States" (p. ix). This project was sponsored by the Committee on Japanese Economic Studies
(p. x). As outlined in the book's introduction, the authors are not in
complete agreement with each other's analyses and conclusions (pp. xxx). Thus, the book offers the reader a variety of perspectives on Japan's high technology industries, by which the authors generally mean
the microelectronics 1 and biotechnology industries. Hugh Patrick2 edited the collection, provided a thoughtful introduction, and also authored the first essay, an overview of Japan's high technology
industrial policy. The authors of the individual essays are professors
of business or the social sciences in the United States and Japan. Consequently, the book is not written in the style of a legal treatise; its
discussions of industrial policy provide few citations to legal materials
and do not emphasize the role oflaw. Thus, while this book may be of
limited practical value to lawyers, it does provide an interesting and
useful introduction to Japanese industrial policy.
Patrick's opening essay provides a broad conceptual overview of
high technology industries and industrial policy in general and a description of Japanese industrial policy in particular. Japanese industrial policy has been motivated by a pragmatic desire to foster the
rapid growth of future key industries while easing the decline of uncompetitive industries, or as Patrick puts it, "picking winners and
phasing out losers" (p. 10). His examination of Japanese industrial
policy shows that it has been responsive to market forces and changing
economic analysis, but not always well conceived. 3 Indeed, he finds
1. The authors include semiconductors, computers, and telecommunications within the
microelectronics industry. P. xiii.
2. R.D. Calkins Professor of International Business in the Graduate School of Business, Co·
lumbia University. Other works include JAPAN AND THE UNITED STATES TODAY: EXCHANGE
RATES, MACROECONOMIC POLICIES AND FINANCIAL MARKET INNOVATIONS (H. Patrick & T.
Ryuichiro eds. 1987); JAPANESE INDUSTRIALIZATION AND ITS SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES (H. Patrick ed. 1976); AslA'S NEW GIANT: How THE JAPANESE ECONOMY WORKS (H. Patrick & H.
Rosovsky eds. 1976).
3. P. 9. Since World War II, Japan's industrial policy has often been ad hoc, neither carefully thought out nor well focused. During the postwar period, the goals of Japanese industrial
policy have slowly evolved. Initially it was oriented toward the domestic market and favored
heavy manufacturing and transportation industries. P. 9. During the 1960s, the government
promoted the growth of energy-intensive industries that were subsequently rendered uncompetitive by the energy price increases of the 1970s. P. 18. Government attempts to restructure the
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that while Japan's industrial policy has been somewhat beneficial for
its economy, the effects have been vastly overrated.4 After discussing
the successes and failures of Japan's industrial policy, Patrick turns to
Japan's current policy needs, which have changed significantly in the
last fifteen years. 5 He concludes by discussing the relevance of Japanese industrial policy for the United States. 6 Patrick argues that as
long as the multilateral exchange rate system7 "is truly open, multilateral, freely operating, and based on the free fl.ow of goods, services,
and capital," it serves as a mechanism of adjustment that incorporates
differences in economies and industrial and economic policies. 8 Thus,
American policy should work to improve the exchange rate system in
order to integrate the Japanese economy into the world economic system (p. 31).
The succeeding chapters provide in-depth descriptions of individual Japanese policies and examine the effects of those policies on various high technology industries. While a variety of topics, including
education, government agencies, government procurement, and research financing, appears intermittently throughout the book, perhaps
the most interesting discussions concern the following three phenomena: gyosei-shido or "administrative guidance," the form of business
combination known as keiretsu, and cooperative research ventures.
The following paragraphs consider the authors' descriptions of each of
these in tum.
petroleum refining industry also failed, at a high social cost. P. 22. As late as the mid-1970s,
there were few sectors in which Japanese research and development activities represented the
leading edge of technology. P. 10. Remarkably, the automobile and consumer electronics industries received no special treatment from the government during their formative years, but succeeded on their own. P. 18.
4. P. 18. Not only have some supported industries failed while other, unsupported industries
have become very successful, see note 3 supra, but some scholars view Japan's vigorous private
sector as the principal cause of the country's economic growth. Patrick believes that industrial
policy may have influenced Japan's economic growth, but probably was not the primary force
behind it. Pp. 18-22.
5. P. 22. It is no longer possible for Japan to identify the important technologies of the
future by observing the United States. Since Japan now stands at the frontier of technology in
most sectors, its industrial policy must be increasingly innovative. In addition, Japan's place in
the world economy has diminished its ability to use trade barriers to promote the growth of its
high technology industries. P. 23.
6. See pp. 25-31. In each policy area, the United States may respond to Japanese policy by
taking no action, seeking Japanese reform, emulating Japanese policy, or counteracting the effects of Japanese policy on American industries. P. 25. The effects of Japanese policy have
increasingly been the subject of debate in the United States. P. 26. Patrick outlines the possible
consequences of various American responses to Japanese policy. See pp. 27-31.
7. This is the system of floating currency exchange rates adopted by the major trading nations of the world since the breakdown of the Bretton Woods exchange rate system in 1973. See
S. BLACK, FLOATING EXCHANGE RATES AND NATIONAL EcONOMIC POLICY 1 (1977).
8. P. 31. Patrick is not the first scholar to note that exchange rates provide the link between
national economies and the world economy. See, e.g., Bernstein, The Economics of Fluctuating
Exchange Rates, in EXCHANGE RATE FLEXIBILITY 9 (J. Dreyer, G. Haberler & T. Willett eds.
1978). See generally EXCHANGE RATE REGIMES AND POLICY INTERDEPENDENCE (A. Hooke
ed. 1983).
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The Japanese Ministry of International Trade and Industry
(MITI) and other government agencies may offer administrative
guidance (informal guidelines without legal sanctions) to help specific
industries with difficult problems. Administrative guidance is described in some detail in Daniel Okimoto's9 essay and reappears at
several points later in the book. Okimoto asserts that administrative
guidance has proved quite valuable, since it permits MITI to tailor
policies selectively to meet changing circumstances without undergoing the rigors of the political process (p. 77). While this technique
gives a significant amount of power to MITI, the agency may not exercise it without limits. 10 In high technology industries, administrative
guidance has most often been used to prevent price cutting abroad (p.
77) and to reduce the risks involved in rapid expansion of capacities
(p. 183).
Okimoto also describes what is perhaps the most distinctive feature
of Japanese business organization, the keiretsu. A keiretsu is a group
of related companies held together by "close and enduring bonds that
transcend ties of legal contract or short-term market considerations"
(p. 58). Hitachi, Mitsubishi, Toshiba, and Toyota are examples of
keiretsu. 11 Keiretsu are characterized by the presence of a dominant
firm which organizes and partially finances the other associated companies, 12 "extensive intra-keiretsu stockholding" (p. 47), and frequent
purchases of intermediate goods from other keiretsu members. 13
Okimoto argues that while keiretsu impose certain costs in terms of
economic efficiency, those disadvantages are outweighed by the desirability of the information-sharing function of keiretsu, the horizontal
linkages represented by keiretsu, and the risk diversification resulting
from intercorporate stockholding and other financial ties (p. 47).
Okimoto also examines the additional effects of extensive intercorporate stockholding, and concludes that the practice has relieved compa9. Associate Professor of Political Science and Co-Director of the Northeast Asia-U.S. Forum on International Policy at Stanford University. Other works include COMPETITIVE EDGE:
THE SEMICONDUCTOR INDUSTRY JN THE U.S. AND JAPAN (D. Okimoto, T. Sugano & F. Weinstein eds. 1984); JAPAN'S EcONOMY: COPING WITH CHANGE JN THE INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENT (D. Okimoto ed. 1982).
10. In a 1974 criminal action against oil refiners and distributors, the Tokyo High Court
ruled that because of government involvement the corporate defendants committed no criminal
offense by joining a price fixing cartel created through MITI administrative guidance. However,
the court found that the cartel itself was illegal because MITI is bound by Japan's Petroleum
Industry Law of 1972. Some limits, the court believed, had to be imposed on uses of administrative guidance. G. ALLEN, THE JAPANESE EcONOMY 42-43 (1981); see also p. 78.
11. P. 47; G. ALLEN, supra note 10, at 126.
12. G. ALLEN, supra note 10, at 126.
13. P. 85. Okimoto also identifies "heavy reliance on the main keiretsu bank for debt financing" as a characteristic of keiretsu. See p. 47. However, Professor Allen of the University of
London suggests that while this was the common practice before World War II, increasing competition within the Japanese banking industry has since led keiretsu members to seek financing
from outside banks. See G. ALLEN, supra note 10, at 126.
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nies of concern for short-term profit maximization, allowing them to
reinvest a larger share of their earnings, which in turn has accelerated
growth (p. 48).
The essay by Kozo Yamamura 14 and, to a lesser extent, the essay
by George Eads 15 and Richard Nelson 16 consider the antitrust implications of the cooperative research projects fostered by the Japanese
government. During the 1950s and 1960s, various laws freed the large
corporations in high technology industries from virtually all antitrust
concerns (p. 183). Even without formal exemptions, all cooperative
research projects seem outside the scope of the Japanese Antimonopoly Act. 17 Two particularly important cooperative research projects
that have been completed are the super-high-performance computer
project, which lasted from 1972 to 1976, and the VLSI (very large
scale integration) project, undertaken between 1976 and 1979 (pp. 185,
252). Both of these projects involved extensive cooperation by such
corporate giants as Fujitsu, Hitachi, NEC, and Toshiba (p. 188). In
all, MITI has led several dozen cooperative projects (pp. 185-93).
Over thirty national projects are presently in progress. 18 MITI not
only tolerates cooperative research, but occasionally uses its influence
to coerce companies into participation (p. 252). Eads and Nelson suggest that MITI does so because most cooperative research projects are
of a sufficiently large scope that single companies would be unwilling
or unable to undertake them and because cooperative research is a
highly efficient way of using resources (pp. 253-54).
Y amamura provides a brief overview of several key sections of the
Japanese Antimonopoly Act. 19 The Act created the Fair Trade Commission (FTC), which has certain limited powers to control monopolies. 20 Even if the FTC establishes that a monopoly exists, which is by
14. Professor in the Jackson School of International Studies, University of Washington.
Other works include POLICY AND TRADE ISSUES OF THE JAPANESE EcONOMY: AMERICAN AND
JAPANESE PERSPECTIVES (K. Yarnarnura ed. 1982); s. HANLEY & K. YAMAMURA, EcONOMIC
AND DEMOGRAPHIC CHANGE IN PREINDUSTRIAL JAPAN (1977); K. YAMAMURA, EcONOMIC
POLICY IN POSTWAR JAPAN (1967).
15. Dean of the School of Public Affairs at the University of Maryland. Other works include
G. EADS, RELIEF OR REFORM: REAGAN'S REGULATORY DILEMMA (1984).
16. Elizabeth S. and A. Varick Stout Professor of Social Sciences in the Department of Economics, Yale University. Other works include R. NELSON, HIGH-TECHNOLOGY POLICIES: A
FIVE-NATION COMPARISON (1984); GOVERNMENT AND TECHNICAL PROGRESS: A CROSS-INDUSTRY ANALYSIS (R. Nelson ed. 1982); R. NELSON, T. SCHULTZ & R. SLIGHTON, STRUCTURAL CHANGE IN A DEVELOPING EcONOMY (1971).
. 17. P. 252. For additional information on the Antimonopoly Act, see notes 19-22 infra and
accompanying text.
18. S. TATSUNO, THE TECHNOPOLIS STRATEGY 36 (1986).
19. Act Concerning Prohibition of Private Monopoly and Maintenance of Fair Trade, Law
No. 54 of 1947, as amended in 1982. For the full text of the Act in English, see H. IYORI & A.
UESUGI, THE ANTIMONOPOLY LAWS OF JAPAN 213-64 (1983). Yarnarnura's overview may be
found at pp. 194-95.
20. The FTC may only prosecute a "monopolistic situation" when an industry's annual sales
exceed fifty billion yen, one company's share of the market exceeds 50% or the shares of the
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no means easy, and overcomes the political challenge sure to be
mounted by MITI, the FTC can not act if such action would "cause a
loss of international competitiveness" (p. 196). Thus it is perhaps not
surprising that, although there is an inherent tension between patent
protection and antitrust laws, 21 the Antimonopoly Act has only rarely
been used against large holders of patents. Only four Japanese cases
involve conflicts between patent law and the Antimonopoly Act (p.
197).
Japan's High Technology Industries was intended to provide an objective analysis and evaluation of Japanese high technology industrial
policy. In actuality it is largely descriptive of Japanese high technology industries and government policy toward them, although it does
carefully examine the success or failure of certain policies. Many of
the essays compare Japanese and American industries and industrial
policy; two also draw comparisons with Europe. Although there is an
extensive literature on the subject of Japanese industrial policy, the
number of works emphasizing international comparison is fairly small.
The number of works devoted strictly to high technology industries is
smaller still. The book's strength is its contribution to this area of
study.
This book is of practical value to only a small portion of the legal
community. Those concerned with trade with Japan may find that the
book contains some helpful information on the structure of the economy and of various industries. Similarly, those interested in the comparison of American and Japanese law, particularly in the antitrust
field, may find that certain sections of this book provide a general introduction to the subject. The primary audience for Japan's High
Technology Industries consists of observers of Japanese industrial pollargest two exceed 75%, entry into the industry is extremely difficult, changes in price over time
are extremely large or small vis-a-vis supply and demand fluctuations, profits or expenses of the
companies in question are excessive, and the FTC has notified the ministry having jurisdiction
over the industry (often MITI) and conducted a public hearing. P. 196. No private plaintiff has
ever successfully brought an antitrust suit in Japan. P. 253.
21. Patents provide a limited monopoly over the exploitation of some inventions, while antitrust laws promote competition. The conflict between the rights afforded by letters patent nnd
antitrust laws is an old one. In the first reported case addressing the issue, Chief Justice Popham
wrote,
[S]uch charter of a monopoly, against the freedom of trade and traffic, is against divers nets
of Parliament, ... notwithstanding any charter of franchise granted to the contrary, or
usage, or custom, or judgment given upon such charters, which charters are adjudged by the
same Parliament to be of no force or effect, and made to the derogation of the Prelates,
Earls, Barons, and grandees of the realm, and to the oppression of the commons.
Darcy v. Allein, 11 Coke 84b, 87b-88a, 77 Eng. Rep. 1260, 1265 (K..B. 1602). Many American
courts have been asked to resolve the tension between the patent law and the Sherman Act. See,
e.g., United States v. Studiengesellschaft Kohle, 670 F.2d 1122, 1127 (D.C. Cir. 1981) ("[T]here
has been a stream of litigation down through the years flowing from the conflict between the
monopoly rights created by the patent laws on one hand and the national policy favoring competition expressed in the antitrust laws on the other."). For a more detailed discussion of this
conflict, see Annotation, Bringing of Patent Infringement Suits as Violation of§§ 1 and 2 of
Sherman Act (15 USCS §§ 1, 2), 62 A.L.R. FED. 203 (1983).
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icy; even armchair observers should find the book both accessible and
interesting. It may well lay the groundwork for further discussion of
high technology industrial policy within that community.

- Steven R. Englund

